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Abstract
We set up a three-ﬁrm model of spatial competition to analyse
how a merger aﬀects the incentives for relocation, and conversely,
how the possibility of relocation aﬀects the proﬁtability of the
merger, particularly for the non-participating ﬁrm. The analysis
is carried out for the assumptions of both mill pricing and price
discrimination, and we also consider the case of partial collusion.
For the case of mill pricing, a merger will generally induce the
merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation
is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the
consumers’ transportation cost function. We also identify a set
of parameter values for which the free-rider eﬀect of a merger
vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve
the ‘merger paradox’, even in the absence of price discrimination.
Keywords: Spatial competition; Merger; Relocation; Partial
collusion.
JEL classiﬁcation: L13, L41, R30
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In imperfectly competitive markets, an important part of the strategic
interaction among ﬁrms occurs along a spatial dimension. More speciﬁ-
cally, the proﬁtability of a given ﬁrm is in many cases highly dependent
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1on the ﬁrm’s location, relative to its competitors. Thus, to the extent
that a ﬁrm is able to inﬂuence its own location, this is one of the most
i m p o r t a n td e c i s i o n st ob em a d eb yﬁrms. If we interpret location in a
physical space, this decision involves the location of production plants
or outlets. This is an especially important consideration in industries
in which physical transportation costs are high. In many industries,
though, location in the product space plays an even more important
role. In this case, the strategic decision involves which type of product
the ﬁrm should produce.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the strategic importance
of spatial competition for ﬁrms’ incentives to merge or collude. More
speciﬁcally, we want to examine how a merger, or partial collusion along
one or more dimensions, aﬀects ﬁrms’ incentives to relocate from an
initial position. The possibility of relocation will, in turn, aﬀect the
incentives for merger or collusion.
In the literature on purely anti-competitive horizontal mergers, a
merger is normally assumed strategically to aﬀect only the ﬁrms’ pricing
or output decisions. The seminal contributions are Salant et. al. (1983)
for the case of Cournot competition, and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
for the case of Bertrand competition. A striking feature of these models
is the so-called ‘merger paradox’: a merger between two or more ﬁrms is
always more beneﬁcial for the ﬁrms not participating in the merger. We
often observe in real-life, though, that a corporate merger is accompanied
by some other structural changes, particularly in the spatial dimension.
Typical examples are relocations of production facilities, or changes in
the product range oﬀered by the merging ﬁrms.1 It is reasonable to
believe that relocations of this kind would aﬀect the proﬁtability of a
merger, also for non-participating ﬁrms in the industry.
We set up a model where ﬁrms can undertake a costly investment in
order to relocate from an initial position. This assumption should ﬁta
broad interpretation of location. If we interpret location in the product
space, it is perhaps most natural to think of the relocation cost as invest-
ment in product R&D. With this interpretation, our paper is also related
to Lin and Saggi (2002), who analyse ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in prod-
uct R&D as a way of increasing the degree of product diﬀerentiation
in a symmetrically diﬀerentiated industry. By assuming a symmetric
Chamberlinian demand system, product R&D has two diﬀerent eﬀects
1In a related, but quite diﬀerent, paper, Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) analyse
the possibilities of introducing a new product, or withdrawing an existing brand, in a
context of horizontal merger. In another study, Berry and Waldfogel (2001) analyse
empirical evidence of the eﬀect of mergers on variety and product repositioning in
US local radio broadcasting markets.
2in their model. In addition to the diﬀerentiation eﬀect, product R&D
by one ﬁrm also increases the demand for all products in the industry
by an equally large amount, which is a somewhat extreme assumption.
In the present paper we choose a model set-up which focuses exclusively
on the diﬀerentiation eﬀect.
With a few exceptions, the eﬀect of mergers on relocation, and vice
versa, has received relatively little attention in the literature. Rothschild
(2000) and Rothschild et al. (2000) analyse the case where three ﬁrms are
initially located on a Hotelling line and can relocate in the anticipation
of a merger between two of the ﬁrms. A problem with this set-up is that
the structure of the industry is ex ante asymmetric, so that the choice
of merger candidates is somewhat arbitrary. Norman and Pepall (2000a,
2000b) solve this problem by assuming that all ﬁrms are initially located
at the market centre, which is a Nash equilibrium in the no-merger game.
The main result in these studies is that the ‘merger paradox’ could be
solved by allowing for the possibility of relocation. However, this result
is obtained under the assumption that ﬁrms are able to engage in price
discrimination. Assuming Cournot competition, this means that the
ﬁrms compete in a continuum of segmented markets.2
In the present paper, we consider a two-ﬁrm merger in a model where
three ﬁrms are initially equidistantly located on a circle. The ﬁrms
are price setters, and we consider both the cases of mill pricing and
spatial price discrimination. Regarding the former case, the most related
paper is probably Levy and Reitzes (1992) who show that a side-by-side
merger is always proﬁtable in a model of this kind. However, they do
not consider the possibility of relocation, which is the main objective of
our paper.
We ﬁnd that a merger gives the merger participants incentives to
relocate under the assumption of mill pricing, but not in the case of
price discrimination. The direction of relocation in the former case is
crucially dependent on the characteristics of consumers’ transportation
costs. Adopting a disutility function with both a linear and a quadratic
component, we ﬁnd that the merger participants will relocate towards
the outsider if the weight attached to the linear part is suﬃciently high.
In this case, we also identify the existence of a set of parameter val-
ues for which a merger will be more proﬁtable for an insider than for
the non-participant. Thus, we show that the possibility of relocation
could possibly solve the ‘merger paradox’ even in the absence of price
discrimination. Regarding welfare considerations, we also show that re-
2Similar assumptions are also used by Matsushima (2001) in a Salop model. Re-
itzes and Levy (1995) consider the case of Bertrand competition with price discrim-
ination in a Salop model.
3location could in some cases improve locational eﬃciency, thus reducing
the negative impact of the merger.
We also extend the model to consider partial collusion in either lo-
cation or price setting. In this case we ﬁnd that partial collusion of
either kind will always provide incentives for relocation, and the direc-
tion of relocation is not dependent on whether or not the ﬁrms are able
to price discriminate. A non-trivial observation is further that for the
case of price discrimination, full collusion (or merger) is always preferred
to partial collusion in terms of locational eﬃciency.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The basic in-
gredients of the model are introduced in Section 2, where the eﬀect of
a merger, and partial collusion, is analysed under the assumption of
mill pricing. Section 3 then replicates the analysis for the case of price
discrimination. Finally, some concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section
4.
2 A model of spatial competition with mill pricing
Consider a population of consumers uniformly distributed, with a con-
stant density of 1, on a circle with circumference l.T h r e e ﬁrms are
located on the circle, with the location of ﬁrm i given by xi. Assuming
unit demand, the utility of a consumer located at z ∈ [0,l], and buying
from ﬁrm i,i sg i v e nb y
U (z,v,xi,p i)=v − pi − t(ψi), (1)
where
ψi =m i n {|z − xi|,l− |z − xi|}, (2)
v is the reservation utility, assumed to be equal for all consumers, pi is
the price charged by ﬁrm i and t(·) is a transportation cost function.
We also assume that v is suﬃciently high for the market always to be
covered, i.e. all consumers are active.
Regarding transportation costs, the standard approach is to assume
these costs to be either linear or quadratic in distance. We will adopt
a functional form that encompasses both the linear and the quadratic
variant as special cases. The costs of travelling a distance ∆ is given by3
t(∆)=a∆ + b∆
2,a , b ≥ 0. (3)
We introduce the notation b zi for the location of the consumer who is
indiﬀerent between buying the good from the two neighbouring ﬁrms i
3A similar cost function is used by Lambertini (2001).
4and i +1 .4 The location of this consumer is implicitly given by
U (b zi,v,x i,p i)=U (b zi,v,x i+1,p i+1).
Given the locations of the indiﬀerent consumers, the market share of
ﬁrm i is given by
Mi = b zi − b zi−1. (4)
We also assume that the ﬁrms can undertake an investment in order
to change their location. We assume that relocation costs are convex in
distance. The cost for ﬁrm i o fr e l o c a t i n gad i s t a n c edi is given by kd2
i,
where k is a positive constant.
The marginal cost of production is assumed to be constant and equal
for all ﬁrms and, without loss of generality, set equal to zero. Firm i’s
(pre-investment) proﬁts are then given by
πi = piMi − kd
2
i. (5)
T h eg a m ei sp l a y e di nt w os t a g e s :
Stage 1: The ﬁrms simultaneously choose the level of investment, di.
Stage 2: The ﬁrms simultaneously set prices, pi.
2.1 Merger
As a benchmark for comparison, we will ﬁrst consider the case in which
all ﬁrms make independent decisions about prices and investments. In
this case the model is completely symmetric. It is easily shown that
each ﬁrm, operating independently, would prefer to be located as far
away from its competitors as possible. Thus, given initial equidistant
locations, the ﬁrms have no incentives to invest in relocation.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium, with di =0 , yields the following






l2 (3a + bl)
27
. (7)
The main focus of the analysis in this subsection is to investigate how
am e r g e rm a yi n ﬂuence the incentives for relocation. Given equidistant
initial locations, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the
merger participants (ﬁrms 1 and 2) are located at 0 and l
3,w i t ht h e
outsider (ﬁrm 3) located at 2l
3 . Obviously, any relocation for the merging
4Because of the geometry of the model any ﬁrm referred as j ±3n i st h es a m ea s
ﬁrm j, for every n ∈ N.
5ﬁrms must be symmetric across both plants (products), thus d1 = −d2.5
We will focus on the relocational incentives of the plant/product located
at 0.L e td denote the distance of relocation, measured in the clockwise
direction. Hence, d<0 implies that the merger participants relocate
in the direction of the outside ﬁrm. Obviously, the outsider has no
incentives to relocate.6 Since the merger participants coordinate their
price setting, the symmetric feature of the model enables us to solve for
the equilibrium by identifying the location of one indiﬀerent consumer
only. Consider the consumer who is indiﬀerent between buying from
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 3. Her location, b z3, is found by solving
















3a + bl +3 bd
¶
. (8)
Due to symmetry and coordinated price setting, the consumer who
is indiﬀerent between buying from either of the merger participants is
located at b z1 = l
6. Furthermore, symmetry also ensures that the market
shares of the merged ﬁrm and the outsider, respectively, are
M1 + M2 =2
µ













Equilibrium prices, as functions of the optimal degree of relocation, is
found by inserting (8)-(10) into the proﬁt functions, (5), and maximising
with respect to prices. This yields
p1 = p2 =
1
27




(4l +3 d)(3a + bl +3 bd), (12)
5This assumption of symmetry regarding the relocation distances is made to fa-
cilitate the analysis and it is not imposed as an exogenous condition. The symmetric
outcome can be obtained by explicitly solving the game for di, i =1 ,2,3.
6Again, besides being an argument derived from the symmetry of the model, this
result can also be obtained as an equilibrium outcome of the relocation game.
6with corresponding proﬁts given by










2 (3a + bl +3 bd). (14)
Let us ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of a merger between two ﬁrms, without
relocation. With d =0the following result can be stated:
Proposition 1 With three ﬁrms initially located equidistantly from each
other, then
(i) a merger between two ﬁrms is always jointly proﬁtable,
(ii) proﬁts are higher for the non-participating ﬁrm.
Proof. (i) Comparing (13) and (7) we ﬁnd that




2 (3a + bl) > 0.
(ii) A comparison of (13) and (14) reveals that




2 (3a + bl) < 0.
This is a restatement of Levy and Reitzes (1992), and corresponds
to the well known results in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). The gain
from price setting coordination, resulting in higher prices, more than
outweighs, in terms of proﬁt s ,t h el o s so fm a r k e ts h a r e sf o rt h em e r g e r
participants. However, the outside ﬁrm enjoys both higher prices and
a higher market share, implying that free-rider incentives are present:
rather than participating in a merger, each ﬁrm would prefer the other
ﬁrms to merge.
Let us now see how a merger between two ﬁrms aﬀects the incen-
tives to relocate. Since the merging ﬁrms would only spend resources
to relocate their plants/products if it increases proﬁts, relocation obvi-
ously increases the proﬁtability of a merger. The question is, however,
whether the merging ﬁrms would relocate away from, or in the direction
of, the outside ﬁrm. The optimal distance of relocation is given by
d
∗ =a r gm a x{π1 + π2}.
Using (13), we ﬁnd the explicit value of the interior solution to be
d
∗ =
18bl +1 0 8 k − 6a − 6
q




7I no r d e rt os e c u r ea ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n 7 we make the assumption that
k ≥ k, i.e. that relocation is suﬃciently costly.8
Proposition 2 The merger participants will relocate towards (away from)
the outside ﬁrm if a>(<) 1
2bl.
Proof. Follows immediately from (15).
The ﬁrst observation to be made is that d is generally non-zero: a
merger between two ﬁrms creates incentives for relocation. Furthermore,
the direction of relocation is generally ambiguous, and depends on the
speciﬁcs of the transportation cost function. It is easy to verify, though,
that ∂d
∂a < 0, ∂d
∂b > 0 and ∂d
∂k < 0 if a<1
2bl.
The merged ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ in deciding on the direction of re-
location: by moving away from the outside ﬁrm price competition is re-
d u c e d ,a tt h ee x p e n s eo fal o w e rm a r k e ts h a r e .A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,t h em e r g e d
ﬁrm can gain a larger share of the market by relocating towards its com-
p e t i t o r .T h en a t u r eo ft h i st r a d e - o ﬀ is determined by the characteristics
of the transportation cost function. If there is a relatively high degree
of convexity in transportation costs, the degree of price competition is
highly dependent on the distance between the ﬁrms. The further apart
the ﬁrms are located, the more costly it is to ‘steal’ market shares from
the competitors, implying that the degree of competition is relatively
lower. Consequently, relocating further away from their competitor is
an eﬀective way for the merger participants to reduce the degree of price
competition.
On the other hand, if there is a relatively low degree of convexity in
transportation costs, the degree of price competition is not suﬃciently
reduced to compensate for the reduction of market share by moving
further away from the competing ﬁr m . I nt h i sc a s e ,t h em a r k e ts h a r e
eﬀect dominates the competition eﬀect, and the merged ﬁrm can increase
proﬁts by moving closer to the outside ﬁrm, thereby controlling a larger
share of the total market.
7I.e., to prevent that the indiﬀerent consumers are pushed outside the market









we have to make the assumption that

















82.1.1 A special case: linear transportation costs
The transport cost function speciﬁed in (3) encompasses the two most
commonly used speciﬁcations in the literature on spatial competition:
linear (b =0 )a n dq u a d r a t i c( a =0 ) transportation costs. In our model,
an interesting result appears for the special case of linear transportation
costs.9 From Proposition 2 it follows that linear transportation costs
implies relocation towards the outside ﬁrm. Comparing the cases with
and without relocation, we ﬁnd that relocation always leads to higher
prices for the merged ﬁrm and lower prices for the outsider. From the
viewpoints of the merging ﬁr m s ,t h ec o s to fc h a r g i n gh i g h e rp r i c e si sa
loss of market share to the outsider. However, the merger participants
can partly compensate for this eﬀect by moving closer to the outside
ﬁrm, which enables the colluding ﬁr m st oc h a r g ee v e nh i g h e rp r i c e s .
The non-participant, on the other hand, now faces a higher degree of
competition, and is forced to reduce its price in order to soften the loss
in market share. Thus, the possibility of relocation for the merged ﬁrm
implies a reduction of both price and market share for the outsider, and
this could potentially cause the well-known free-rider eﬀect to vanish.
Proposition 3 When transportation costs are linear in distance, a merger
participant earns higher proﬁts than a non-participant if the cost of re-
location is suﬃciently small.
Proof. Inserting lim
b→0
d∗ from (15) into (13)-(14), we ﬁnd that












Imposing the restriction k ≥ k,w eh a v et h a t










The Proposition identiﬁes a (small) range of k for which each ﬁrm
would like to participate in the merger, rather than waiting for the other
ﬁrms to merge.10
9The relevant equilibrium expressions for this case is easily found by inserting
lim
b→0
d∗ into (8)-(14). Note also that linear transportation costs implies k = 3
4a.
10Although we have shown that the free rider eﬀect might vanish when the trans-
portation cost function is linear, this result is not restricted to this particular case.
92.2 Welfare
We apply the standard deﬁnition of social welfare, W,a st h es u mo f
consumers’ and producers’ surplus, which in our case reduces to:







With the assumptions of unit demand and a non-binding reservation
price for consumers, social welfare does not depend on prices directly,
but is given by the sum of consumers’ gross valuation, vl, net of total
transportation and relocation costs. Thus, a welfare analysis in this
kind of model is basically an analysis along one dimension only, namely
locational eﬃciency.
Using the symmetry properties of the model, the expressions for so-
cial welfare in the merger and no-merger cases, respectively, are found
to be













Assume ﬁrst that relocation is not possible. Comparing (16) and
(17), we ﬁnd that





Thus, a merger is socially harmful even if it does not lead to any re-
location. Post-merger there is a price diﬀerence between the merger
participants and the non-participant which implies that a larger share
of consumers is buying from the outside ﬁrm. This causes an increase in
the total outlay on transportation costs.
A closer inspection of (16) and (17) also reveals that Wm−Wnm < 0
for the equilibrium value of d, implying that a merger is always socially
harmful. However, once two ﬁrms have merged welfare is not maximised
at d =0 . Thus, from society’s point of view there are incentives for
relocation, as long as this is in the right direction. The possibility of
For example, if we consider b 6=0and costless relocation (k =0 ), a merging ﬁrm also
obtains higher proﬁtt h a tt h eo u t s i d e ri f0.64bl < a < 0.70bl.
10relocation means that the negative impact of a merger, in terms of social
welfare, could be reduced if the merger participants relocates away from
the outsider. The exact condition is given by the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Given that a merger takes place, relocation leads to a





Proof. From (16) we ﬁnd that






2 − 93da +1 5 d




Wm(d) − Wm(d =0 )> 0 iﬀ 0 <d<d,
where
d =
108k +2 7 bl +9 3 a −
q
(27bl +1 0 8 k +9 3 a)
2 − 60bl(4a + bl)
30b
.
This result, which is not immediately obvious, can be explained as
follows: consider the location of the consumer who is indiﬀerent be-
tween buying from ﬁrm 1 and 3, given by b z3. For any set of prices, the
optimal location of this indiﬀerent consumer is mid-way between ﬁrms
1 and 3. With a merger, but without relocation, b z3 gets too close to
ﬁrm 1, because of the merger-induced price increase. If ﬁrm 1 relocates
(marginally) away from ﬁrm 3, then b z3 moves in the same direction, but
by a smaller distance than ﬁrm 1. This implies that b z3 gets relatively
closer to ﬁrm 3, and thus closer to the ‘new’ midpoint, which is a welfare
improvement.
Combining Propositions 2 and 4, it is apparent that a<1
2bl is a nec-
essary condition for welfare improving relocations. It is diﬃcult, though,
to provide a further general characterisation of the condition given in
Proposition 2, in terms of the parameters of the model. However, we
can use the expression for d to analyse three special cases. If reloca-




if a ∈ (0.44bl,0.50bl). If
t r a n s p o r tc o s t sa r el i n e a ri nd i s t a n c e( b =0 ), relocation is always welfare
detrimental as the condition a<1
2bl cannot be satisﬁed. For quadratic
transportation costs (a =0 ), we know that the ﬁrms relocate in the
‘right’ direction. However, it turns out that the distance of relocation
is always excessive, i.e. d∗ > d, and thus socially undesirable, for every
value of b and k within the valid ranges.
112.3 Partial collusion
So far we have assumed that the merger participants coordinate both
the price setting and the relocation decisions. These are obvious as-
s u m p t i o n si fw er e g a r dt h em e r g e dﬁrm as a new fully integrated entity.
However, the analysis of mergers when the diﬀerent plants are main-
tained is similar to an analysis of collusion, as long as other eﬀects, like
e.g. cost synergies or defection, are not considered. Thus, the model pre-
sented in the previous section might also be interpreted as a cartel where
the participants coordinate their decisions with respect to both strategic
variables. Therefore, it is also interesting to ask the question of how the
analysis would change if ﬁrms were able to coordinate decisions with re-
spect to only one of the variables. There are several reasons why partial
collusion might be relevant. For example, antitrust legislation may make
price coordination infeasible, or at least diﬃcult. It is reasonable to as-
sume, though, that a coordination of relocation decisions is much less
likely to be prohibited by antitrust authorities. Other examples where
partial collusion might be relevant include franchises or regulation in
which the franchiser, or the regulator, decides locations (prices) of the
ﬁrms, but let these compete in prices (locations). As another example
of partial collusion in prices, we can think of a situation in which the
ﬁrms independently make relocation investments, anticipating that two
of the ﬁr m sm i g h tm e r g eo rc o l l u d ei nt h ef u t u r e . 11
2.3.1 Collusion in prices
To carry out this analysis we should ﬁr s t l yn o t i c et h a tw ec a n n o ta
priori apply an argument of symmetry for the relocation distances of
the colluding ﬁrms, since they must be treated as independent variables.
Thus, let di denote the distance of relocation, measured in the clockwise
direction, with respect to its original position for ﬁrm i.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the location of the indiﬀerent consumers between ﬁrm i and ﬁrm i +1 ,














l + di+1 − b zi
¶
,
while the proﬁts are given by
πi = piMi − kd
2
i = pi(b zi − b zi−1) − kd
2
i. (18)
At stage two of the game, ﬁrms 1 and 2 are assumed to coordinate their
price setting. Proﬁt maximisation leads to a system of equilibrium prices
11In a somewhat diﬀerent setting, the case of partial collusion in prices is also
considered in Friedman and Thisse (1993), who analyse a location-then-price game
when the ﬁrms anticipate collusion in prices.
12pi (d1,d 2,d 3), i =1 ,2,3. By substituting pi (d1,d 2,d 3) back into (18), we
can express proﬁts as functions of the relocation distances alone.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game the colluding ﬁrms act independently,
so that each ﬁrm maximises individual proﬁts by choosing di.U s i n gt h e
fact that, by symmetry, d2 = −d1 and d3 =0 ,p r o ﬁt maximisation yields
the following solution for d1:
d1 ≡ dp =





where A>0 is a function of the parameters of the model.12
Equilibrium prices and proﬁts are found by substituting dp for d in
(11)-(14). It is straightforward to show that dp is always non-negative,13
which establishes the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Under partial collusion in prices, the colluding ﬁrms will
r e l o c a t e ,i fa ta l l ,a w a yf r o mt h eo u t s i d eﬁrm.
The intuition is found by comparing with the case of full collusion, or
merger. Consider the decision of ﬁrm 1 to possibly relocate as a response
to price collusion with ﬁrm 2. When the ﬁrms do not coordinate their
location decisions, there is an extra cost associated with moving away
from this ﬁrm (i.e. moving towards ﬁrm 3). The gain in market share
vis-à-vis ﬁrm 3 is accompanied by a loss of market share to ﬁrm 2.
Consequently, the competition eﬀect always dominates, and the ﬁrms
engaged in price collusion will move closer together.
It is worth noting that the special case of linear transportation costs




The intuition is relatively straightforward. In this case price competition
is not reduced by moving further away from ﬁrm 3, and there is no net
gain of market share by moving in either direction.
12A = 46656a2k2+8208a2bkl+31104abk2l+121a2b2l2+6912ab2kl2+5184b2k2l2+
154ab3l3 + 1392b3kl3 +4 9 b4l4.





must be satisﬁed to ensure an interior solution.
132.3.2 Collusion in locations
When the ﬁrms coordinate their location decisions but compete in prices
the analysis is similar. The two main diﬀerences are that at the second
stage ﬁrms maximise individual proﬁts, whereas at the ﬁrst stage the
colluding ﬁr m sm a x i m i s ej o i n tp r o ﬁts with respect to the relocation de-
cisions. Following the same procedure as in the previous section and
again applying arguments of symmetry, it is directly shown that prices
are given by
p1 = p2 =
(5l − 3dl)(3a +3 bdl + bl)(3a − 6bdl + bl)
9(15a − 12bdl +5 bl)
, (20)
p3 =
(3a +3 bdl + bl)(15al − 15bldl +5 bl2 +1 8 adl − 9bd2
l)




(5l − 3dl)2(6a − 3bdl +2 bl)(3a − 6bdl + bl)(3a +3 bdl + bl)





(3a +3 bdl + bl)(15al − 15bldl +5 bl2 +1 8 adl − 9bd2
l)2
27(15a − 12bdl +5 bl)2 , (23)
where dl is the interior solution of the ﬁfth-degree polynomial deﬁned by
∂(π1 + π2)/∂dl =0 .
Unfortunately, and due to the ﬁfth-degree nature of the problem, it
is impossible to ﬁnd an explicit expression for the interior solution. It
can be shown, though, that dl < 0 for every permissible value of the
parameters. Again, the intuition is clearly tractable. If the ﬁrms do not
coordinate their location and price decisions at all, we know that neither
ﬁrm has any incentive to relocate, since the increased competition with
the closer neighbouring ﬁrm more than oﬀsets, in terms of proﬁts, the
decrease in competition with the other neighbour. However, if two of the
ﬁrms are able to coordinate their location decisions, they can make sure,
by both moving in the direction of the third ﬁrm, that the decrease
in the degree of competition between them is suﬃciently reduced to
more than compensate for the increase in the degree of price competition
with the third ﬁrm.14 Moreover, as there is not any agreement between
the colluding ﬁrms to increase their price, the outsider faces stronger
competition and a lower market share, which eliminates any free-riding
14The unique case which permits tractable analysis is the one with linear trans-
portation costs (b =0 ), in which dl = − 5al
3(25k−a),w h e r ek> 9
25a ensures an interior
solution. The quadratic case (a =0 ) with no relocation costs (k =0 ) implies
dl = −0.027l.
14eﬀect and even lower its proﬁts compared with the situation with no
collusion. The next proposition summarises these results:
Proposition 6 With partial collusion in location, then
(i) the colluding ﬁrms relocate towards the outsider and make higher
proﬁts than this ﬁrm,
(ii) the outsider makes less proﬁts, compared with the case without
collusion.
2.3.3 Welfare and proﬁtc o m p a r i s o n s
For the case of partial collusion in locations, it is easily shown that social
welfare is maximised at d =0 . This is an obvious result. Since prices
are set non-collusively, total transportation costs are always minimised
with symmetric locations. Furthermore, it is also possible to show that
partial collusion in locations is always preferred, from a welfare point of
view, to full collusion (or merger). For the special cases of linear and
quadratic transportation costs, it is also possible to show that partial
collusion in prices is preferred to total collusion. Again, this is not too
surprising.
Comparing welfare for the two diﬀerent kinds of partial collusion,
it can also be shown, for the case of linear transportation costs, that
partial collusion in locations is socially preferred to partial collusion in
prices if the cost of relocation is suﬃciently large.15
The private incentives for the diﬀerent kind of collusion do not neces-
sarily correspond with the social incentives. For the colluding ﬁrms, full
collusion is preferred to price collusion, which is preferred to collusion
in location. For the outsider, full collusion and price collusion are both
preferred to collusion in location. However, collusion in prices might be
preferred to full collusion, at least for linear transportation costs.
3 Price discrimination
The model considered in the previous section has been set up in the
classical Salop-Hotelling view of spatial product diﬀerentiation, where
transportation costs are borne by consumers. In the taste-space inter-
pretation the transportation cost is seen as a kind of disutility suﬀered
by a consumer when she has to buy a product that diﬀers from her most
favoured one.
In this section we want to reproduce the previous analysis under the
assumption that transportation costs are paid by the ﬁrms, and not the
15For the case of b =0we ﬁnd that social welfare is higher with partial collusion in




15consumers. We maintain the standard assumption in this kind of mod-
els that ﬁrms are able to price discriminate among consumers, implying
that they can charge diﬀerent prices according to the cost of delivery.
The physical-space interpretation of this model is straightforward. A
taste-space interpretation is a bit more subtle, though. In this case
one could think of the location of a ﬁrm as a particular product design
or model to which the ﬁrm makes modiﬁcations according to customer
preferences.16 Thus, the cost of supplying the product to a particular
consumer increases with the amount of changes required by the con-
sumer.
W ec a na p p l yt h es a m em o d e la p p a r a t u sa n dn o t a t i o na si nt h ep r e -
vious section, with the exception that transportation costs, t(·),a r ep a i d
by the ﬁrms. Thus a consumer located at z ∈ [0,l] and buying from ﬁrm
i derives a utility given by
U = v − pi,
where pi represent the price charged by the ﬁrm at point z.17 Firm
i, located at xi, pays per-unit transportation costs equal to t(ψi) for
deliveries to a consumer located at z,w h e r eψi is given by (2). Since we
have assumed zero production cost, t(ψi) c a nb es e e na st h em a r g i n a l
cost of production for ﬁrm i at location z.
In order to analyse the price decisions at the second stage of the
game, for any given location z we can make a ranking of the ﬁrms in
t e r m so fd i s t a n c ef r o mz. Starting with the closest ﬁrm, we use the
indices i, j and k. Thus, at location z there are three potential suppliers
with three diﬀerent marginal costs engaging in Bertrand competition.
Consequently, ﬁrm i will be the only supplier of the product at point





. By this reasoning, ﬁrm i will capture all the market segments for











[t(ψk) − t(ψi)]dz, (24)
where Ωij (Ωik) represents the market segment for which ﬁrm i is the
closest and ﬁrm j (k) is the second closest ﬁrm.
16This also corresponds to the interpretation of Eaton and Schmitt (1994), where
transportation costs are interpreted as the cost of producing variations on a basic
product.
17As we will see later on, this price is in general a function of the consumer’s
location and the locations of the ﬁrms.
163.1 Merger
Once more, we want to use the no-merger equilibrium as a benchmark. In
this case the model is completely symmetric, the ﬁr m sh a v en oi n c e n t i v e s





Let us now assume that ﬁrms 1 and 2 merge, or fully collude. Apart
from jointly choosing locations in the ﬁrst stage of the game, the two
ﬁrms also agree not to invade each other markets in the price game, and
face competition only from ﬁrm 3. We will refer to this kind of collusion
as Market Sharing Agreement.19 It is easy to see that it is in the best
interest of the merger participants to divide the market according to an
eﬃciency rule: ﬁrm 1 will only supply the market segment for which it
has the lowest marginal delivery cost, and vice versa.B ys y m m e t r y ,a n d
the fact that the merger participants coordinate their location decisions,
we can ap r i o r iassume d1 = d, d2 = −d and d3 =0 .U s i n g t h e f a c t
that the market limits between any two ﬁrms are at the middle points,
proﬁts are given by
π1 = π2 =
1
108
(3d + l)(−27ad +9 bd







2(3a +3 bd + bl). (27)
Maximising (π1 + π2) with respect to d,w eﬁnd that the optimal distance
of relocation is given by d∗ =0 .T h u s ,








Proposition 7 With three ﬁrms initially located equidistantly from each
other, then
(i) a merger (full collusion) between two ﬁr m si sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable,
(ii) the non-participant’s proﬁts and the ﬁrms’ locations are unaf-
fected by the merger.
18It is indeed straightforward to show that the symmetric outcome xi =
(i−1)l
3 is
a Nash equilibrium in locations.
19A general treatment of this kind of collusion, albeit in a very diﬀerent setting, is
given by Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2001).
17The only eﬀect of the merger is that competition is reduced for the
market segment between the merger participants. In this segment, the
merged entity can set prices equal to the marginal delivery costs of the
outside ﬁrm, and use the nearest located plant for deliveries. There is
no scope for any strategic response from the outside ﬁrm. Furthermore,
as the merging ﬁrms are not able to charge higher prices at any point in
t h em a r k e ti ft h e yr e l o c a t e , 20 total proﬁts for the merger participants are
maximised at locations where total transportation costs for the market
segment controlled by the merged ﬁrms are minimised. Thus, there are
no incentives to relocate away from the initial symmetric locations. This
explains the results in Proposition 7, which also implies that there is no
free-rider eﬀect.21
3.2 Welfare
Using the previously established deﬁnition, social welfare in the model
with discriminatory pricing is given by











Since, by symmetry, d3 =0and d1 = −d2 = d we can get an explicit
expression for (30) as










Since a merger does not aﬀect locations, welfare is unaﬀected as well.
It is also easily veriﬁed that (31) is maximised at d =0 , yielding





which is identical to welfare in the model of mill pricing with no merger.
3.3 Partial collusion
3.3.1 Market Sharing Agreement
In this section we will assume that the colluding ﬁrms agree on an eﬃ-
c i e n ts h a r i n go ft h em a r k e ts e g m e n tt h a tt h e ya r ea b l et oc o n t r o l ,b u t
make independent decisions about location. As the outcome of this
analysis must be symmetric, and relocation investment of ﬁrm 3 is an
20These prices are determined by the distance to ﬁrm 3, which remains constant.
21This is similar to the results in Reitzes and Levy (1995) for a merger between
neighbouring ﬁrms.
18independent variable, we can ap r i o r imake the assumption that d3 =0 .
However, d1 and d2 must be treated as independent variables. The prof-










Maximising π1 with respect to d1, and using the fact that by sym-
metry d2 = −d1, we can easily solve for d1 to obtain
d1 ≡ dm =









16bl ensures an interior solution. It is easily veriﬁed that
dm > 0, implying that a market sharing agreement leads the colluding
ﬁrms to relocate away from the outsider. Thus, the equivalent result for
the model of mill pricing is replicated. These incentives arise because
ﬁrm 1 can gain some market share from ﬁr m2b ym o v i n gc l o s e rt ot h i s
ﬁrm. This is accompanied by a corresponding loss of market share to
ﬁrm 3. However, the market share gained from ﬁrm 2 is much more
valuable since ﬁrm 1 does not face competition from ﬁrm 2, and is thus
able to charge higher prices in this market segment. Consequently, ﬁrm
1 has an incentive to relocate towards ﬁrm 2, and vice versa.B o t h
colluding ﬁrms would be better oﬀ, though, by forming an agreement to
remain at the original locations.
Equilibrium proﬁts for the colluding ﬁrms and the outsider are found
by substituting d for dm in (26)-(27). It is then easily veriﬁed that the
market sharing agreement is proﬁtable for the colluding ﬁrms. Moreover,
since ∂π3
∂d > 0 and dm > 0 this kind of collusion is also always proﬁtable
for the outsider. When the competing ﬁrms move further away, ﬁrm 3
is allowed to charge higher prices and serve a larger market segment.
The comparison between the outsider and the colluding ﬁr m si sl e s s
direct, though, but we are clearly able to identify a possible free-rider
eﬀect for some combinations of parameter values. For the case of linear
transportation costs (b =0 )w eh a v et h a tπ1 > π3 if k>0.89a,w h e r e a s
quadratic transportation costs (a =0 )i m p l i e st h a tπ1 > π3 if k>0.64bl.
Thus, a free-rider eﬀect is present for suﬃciently low relocation costs,
which is quite intuitive, given that competition is considerably reduced
for the outside ﬁrm in this case.
3.3.2 Collusion in locations
Assume that ﬁrms do not reach any market sharing agreement, but
coordinate their locational decisions. As d1 and d2 are not independent
v a r i a b l e sw ec a nap r i o r iassume that d1 = −d2 = d and d3 =0 . In this
19case, proﬁts for the colluding ﬁrms are given by
π1 = π2 =
1
108
(6d − l)(3d + l)(−6a +3 bd − 2bl) − kd
2, (35)
whereas proﬁts for the outside ﬁrm is given by (27). Maximising (π1 + π2)
with respect to d,w eﬁnd the optimal distance of relocation, dl,t ob e
given by
dl =
6bl +2 4 k +2 4 a −
p
(24a +2 4 k +6 bl)2 +7 2 b(2al + bl2)
36b
. (36)
It is easily veriﬁed that dl < 0,s oo n c em o r e ,t h ee q u i v a l e n tr e s u l tf r o m
the model of mill pricing is replicated. By moving towards the outsider,
ﬁrm 1 gains some market share from this ﬁrm, without losing any cus-
tomers to ﬁrm 2 since these ﬁrms coordinate locations. Furthermore,
although the delivery cost to consumers between the merging ﬁrms in-
creases they can also be charged higher prices since ﬁr m2a l s om o v e s
away from this market segment.
From (27) we know that ∂π3
∂d > 0. Thus, this kind of collusion always
harms the outside ﬁrm, since it faces increased competition from both
neighbours. Obviously, and by construction, partial collusion in location
is always proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ec o l l u d i n gﬁrms.
3.3.3 Welfare and proﬁtc o m p a r i s o n s
Using the measure of social welfare given by (30), it is possible to show
that partial collusion in the price game (market sharing agreement) is
socially more harmful than partial collusion in locations. More interest-
ing, though, is a welfare comparison between full collusion and partial
collusion.
Proposition 8 When ﬁrms engage in price discrimination, full collu-
sion (or a merger) between two ﬁrms is always preferred to partial col-
lusion of either kind.
The proof is straightforward. We know that social welfare is always
maximised at symmetric locations, i.e. d =0 , which minimises total
transportation costs. Since a merger, or full collusion, implies d =0 ,
whereas partial collusion yields d 6=0 , the result follows immediately.
Regarding the privates incentives, the colluding ﬁr m sa l w a y sp r e f e r
total collusion over any kind of partial collusion, and a market sharing
agreement over collusion in location. The outsider, on the other hand,
prefers a market sharing agreement over total collusion, which, in turn,
is preferred to collusion in location.
20It may seem surprising that full collusion should be socially preferred
t op a r t i a lc o l l u s i o n .H o w e v e r ,w eh a v et ob es o m e w h a tc a u t i o u sw i t ht h e
interpretation when we perform a welfare analysis in this kind of mod-
els. With unit demand there is no eﬃciency loss associated with a price
in excess of marginal costs. A price increase is just a one-to-one util-
ity transfer from consumers to producers. Thus, we should perhaps be
particularly careful about distributional issues when we consider welfare
eﬀects of collusion in this model.
One way to introduce a distributional dimension to the analysis is
to assume the existence of a social planner that attaches weights α and
(1 − α), respectively, to consumers’ and producers’ surplus. In the fol-
lowing, we will assume that α > 1
2, implying that the social planner puts
a relatively stronger emphasis on consumers’ surplus.
With the preferences of the social planner given by the parameter
α, social welfare when two ﬁrms relocate a distance d and engage in a
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On the other hand, if two ﬁrms relocate a distance d but do not engage
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From the previous results in this section, we know that Wm(d =0 )
corresponds to merger, or full collusion, whereas Wnm (d =0 ) corre-
sponds to no collusion.
Comparing (37) and (38) we can conﬁrm that a merger is always
harmful:
Wm(d =0 )− Wnm (d =0 )=
1
54
(1 − 2α)(3a +2 bl) < 0.
From (37) it is easily veriﬁed that Wm is maximised at d 6=0for
every α 6= 1
2. Letting dw denote the optimal distance of relocation in the
case of a market sharing agreement between two ﬁrms, it can be shown
that dw < 0 for α > 1
2. Thus, given that a market sharing agreement
21has taken place, its negative eﬀect on consumers can be reduced if the
colluding ﬁrms relocate towards the outsider. However, from Section
3.3.1 we know that partial collusion in the price game implies d>0.
Thus, partial collusion, in the form of a market sharing agreement, is
still more harmful than total collusion for every α > 1
2.
Regarding partial collusion in location we can easily show that Wnm
is maximised at d =0for every value of α. Thus, partial collusion in
location, which implies dl < 0, is always socially harmful, irrespective of
the social planner’s preferences. However, partial collusion in location
is preferred to full collusion if α is suﬃciently large. For instance, with
linear transportation costs (b =0 ), a comparison of (37) and (38) shows
that
Wnm(d = dl) >W m(d =0 )
if
α >
19a2 +3 6 ak +1 6 k2




4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse how horizontal mergers
might create incentives for relocation within a framework of spatial com-
petition, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation might aﬀect
the proﬁtability of non-participating ﬁrms, as well as locational eﬃ-
ciency (social welfare). In order to facilitate analytical tractability, we
have used a rather simple set-up, where we consider a two-ﬁrm merger
in an industry with three price-setting ﬁrms initially located in symmet-
ric fashion on a circle. Given this speciﬁc industry structure, we have
covered a variety of diﬀerent assumptions about price setting and coor-
dinating behaviour, including both the cases of mill pricing and price
discrimination, as well as distinguishing between merger and partial col-
lusion in either price setting or relocation decisions.
We have found that whether or not a merger creates incentives for
relocation depends crucially on whether or not the ﬁr m se n g a g ei np r i c e
discrimination. If ﬁrms are not able to price discriminate, a merger will
generally lead to a relocation of the plants (products) of the merger par-
ticipants, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and depends on
the characteristics of the transportation cost (disutility) function. Re-
garding the eﬀects of a merger on the proﬁts of the non-participating
ﬁrm, the possibility of relocation implies that the well-known free-rider
eﬀect could be either mitigated or reinforced, depending on the direc-
tion of relocation. If a merger leads to a relocation in the direction
of the outside ﬁr m ,w eh a v es h o w nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fas e to fp a r a m e t e r
values for which the free-rider eﬀect vanishes. Thus, the possibility of
22relocation could solve the ‘merger paradox’ even in the absence of price
discrimination.
Except for the special case of linear transportation costs, partial col-
lusion will always provide incentives for relocation, and the direction
of relocation is not dependent of whether or not the ﬁrms are able to
price discriminate. Perhaps the most interesting result in this dimension
of the analysis is that total collusion (or merger) could be preferred to
partial collusion, from a viewpoint of social welfare, if the ﬁrms engage
in price discrimination. This result holds also for the case of a social
planner who puts more weight on consumers’ surplus than ﬁrm proﬁts.
Due to the potential complexities involved in performing a joint
analysis of the questions of merger and location choices in a spatial
framework, we have been forced to consider a fairly particular set of
assumptions. Important questions that are not touched on in our analy-
sis include the possibility of entry to the industry. We have also made
the analysis tractable by setting up a three-ﬁrm analysis, which implies
that the non-participating ﬁrm has no incentives to relocate. Generally,
though, we would expect the relocation incentives of non-participating
ﬁr m sa l s ot ob ea ﬀected by a merger. Thus, the present analysis should
perhaps be seen as a ﬁrst stepping stone towards a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the eﬀects of merger and collusion in a spatial
framework.
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